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EDITOR'S NOTE
Dr. Virgil Hurlburt finish ed the first draft of th is publication in
October , 1962. After a long illness h e died on November 30, 1962.
I was asked by the North Central La nd T enure R esearch Committee
to carry th e work on this manuscript forward to completion .
R epresen ting his last work, this publication is a fitting monumen t
to Dr. Hurlburt's memory, a nd his tireless efforts in the field of land
tenure research. His humor, perseverance, and productivity will be
long missed by his m a n y associates.
Howard W . Ottoson

Foreword
In J 952 the North Central L and Ten ure R esearch Committee
(NCR-6) created a subcommittee to work on the topic " Effects of
Alternative Tenure Arrangements on the Use a nd Prod uctivi ty of
Farm Resources." In part, interest in this topic was stimulated by
questions raised in earlier work of the Farm Tena ncy Subcommittee of
NCR-6 on farm rental problems and practices.
T he work of the new subcommittee occurred in two stages. The
first stage, based on data from Iowa a nd Illino is which h ad been collected as part of a nother study, dealt primarily with r esearch techn iques. It was reported in North Central Regional Publication No. 84.1
The second stage of the work involved the testing of several hypotheses concerning the influence of tenure arrangem ents on en terprise organization and the allocation of resources. The a nalyses were
empirically b ased on an interstate study area located in sou th western
I owa, n ortheastern Ka nsas, northwestern Missouri, and southeastern
Nebraska. The work was carried on under a cooperative agreement
b etween the experiment stations of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and
N ebraska, and the Econom ic Research Service of the USDA. For convenience, the field su rvey was made by personnel of the four states
independently in 1957, after a common ra ndom sample h ad been
drawn . The analysis was also divided among the four states and the
ERS, with each m aking use of data from the four-state a rea. Iowa
concentrated on the effect of tenure arrangements on resource productivity and farm efficiency; Kansas dealt with the effect of ten u re arrangements on improvements to land and build ings ; Missouri analyzed the
relationship between tenure arrangements and size of farm; while
Nebraska worked on the effects of tenure arrangements on short-run
resou rce allocation. T h e ERS u ndertook an an alysis of returns-cost
ra tios and income transfers between parties to leases, as well as
1 Walte r G. Mille r , Walter
E . C h ryst, and Howard W. Ottoson. R elative Efficiencies of Farm T enure Classes in l ntrafirm Resource A /loca tion. North Central
R egional Publ ication No. 84. Iowa Agr icul tural Experiment Station Bulletin 461.
1958.

2

assuming responsibility for coordination of the work and integration
of the results into a regional report. This publication reports the
more significant findings in the four states.
Members of the subcommittee on Alternative Tenure Arrangements, during the time it was active, and the cooperating agencies,
included:
John Timmons
Wilfred Pine
Frank Miller
Howard Ottoson
Walter Chryst
Walter Miller
Virgil Hurlburt
Gene Wunderlich
D. Gale Johnson
Joseph Ackerman

Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station
Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station
Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station
ERS, U. S. Department of Agriculture
ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture
ERS, U.S. Department of Agriculture
ERS, U. S. Department of Agriculture
University of Chicago
Farm Foundation

Sydney Staniforth from the University of ·w isconsin and Philip
Raup from the University of Minnesota also were consulted on phases
of the study.
Other publications resulting from this study include:
Walter G. Miller. Comparative Efficiency of Farm T enure Classes
in Combination of R esources. USDA, Agricultural Economics Research.
January, 1959.
Paul W. Barkley and Wilfred H. Pine. Effects of Farm T enure on
Farm Improvem ents. Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin
No. 454. June, 1963.
Dorwin Williams and Frank Miller. Land T enure Arrangem ents in
R elation to Scale of Farming Op erations and R esource Use in the
Marshall Soil Areas of Northw est Missouri and Adjoining States.
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 809.
July, 1962.
Duane Neuman and Howard W. Ottoson. T enure T ype, Organization and R esource Use on Farms in South east ern N ebraska. Agricultural Economics Report No. 32. Nebraska Agricultural Experiment
Station. 1964.
Howard W. Ottoson, Walter G. Miller, and Murray Cormack.
Research Bulletin in Process. Nebraska Agricultural Experiment
Station .
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Use of Farm Resources As Conditioned

by

Tenure Arrangements
By Virgil L. Hurlburt2

I. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY

3

How do tenure arrangements affect organization a nd use of
resources within farm firms? Do lease terms and arrangements affect
quantities and kinds of inputs? Does the tenant and the landlord each
receive full earnings of the resources h e contributes to the farm business? Which of the strictly tenure-oriented characteristics of farms, as
contrasted with the general economic problems of all farms, help to
explain differences between and within owner-operated (00), cropshare cash tenant-operated (CSC) and livestock-share tenant-operated
(LS) farms? These are the major questions to which answers were
sought in the research reported here.
Miller, Chryst, and Ottoson found few significant differences
between tenure classes in efficiencies of resource use. 4
It has been shown that the types of resource adjustment needed to
approach optimum production levels vary to some extent according to
tenure status. But it was suggested also that part of the differences obser ved
in marginal returns could arise from the nature of the estimating equations
as well as from biases in the values on which land inputs were based. Furthermore, when the differentials in age distribution between tenure classes
were taken into account, the levels of significance of the differences observed
were reduced considerably. The extent of deviations from the optimum
resource combinations under each tenure class appears to be unimportant
because the average reductions in cost, especially percentage wise, are "small"
and do not differ significantly between the tenure classes. These observations
then introduce the possibility that either no real economic problems exist
for the broad tenure classes or the methods used are inadequate for detecting
the inefficiencies present. On the one hand, it could be argued that the
differences are hidden by the aggregative nature of the analytical model.
On the other, one might say that within the broad tenure classes the heterogeneity of tenure arrangements could have cancelled the inefficiencies (if any)
present. Therefore, both facets of the problem require further inquiry. (p. 334)

The present study was designed to deal with both inter and intra
tenure differences through analysis of data from a sample of farms in
Resource Development Economics Division, ERS, USDA, Ames, Iowa.
Editors note: The comments of members of the North Central Land Tenure
Research Committee, particularly those of Peter Domer, E. B. Hill, Frank Miller,
and Franklin Reiss are acknowledged, as are those of Gene vVunderlich.
4 \ Valter G. M iller, Walter E. Chryst and Howard W. Ottoson. Relative Efficiencies of Farm Tenure Classes in Intrafirm Resources Allocation. North Central
Regional Publication 84. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Sta tion Bulletin 461. 1958.
2
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a selected geographic area, selected so as to limit heterogeneity, and
to provide opportunity for specific comparisons of selected facets. 5

II. EFFECT OF TENURE ON RESOURCE COMBINATIONS AND
FACTOR USES.
Are the differences between tenures cancelled by the heterogeneity
of arrangements within tenures 6 in the usual forms of aggregative
analysis? Present findings support an affirmative answer. But there
is also evidence that efficiency in resource use is a function of the
general problems of firm organization and operation, as well as of
specific tenure arrangements. Particularly, differences between tenures
tend to disappear when variables such as total capital are equal between
groups of farms.

Size of Business
LS farms, as a group, were larger than CSC farms and CSC farms
were larger than the 00 farms in the sample. This was the situation
whether size is measured in acres per farm, cropland acres, total
annual inputs, or value of production. The fact of difference in size
raises the question of whether farms are larger because they are
tenant-operated, or are tenant-operated because they are larger.
Capital availability and interests of the two parties influence the
choice of lease type on rented farms; with the amounts of capital
usually controlled by individuals, two parties can form a larger business
than one party alone, particularly under a LS lease. But some farms
operated under CSC leases and by OOs were as large as the largest LS
farm in the sample. There is nothing inherent in the lease type itself
that requires a larger size of business for the LS arrangement than
for other leases. But a larger business may be encouraged by the fact
of sharing in costs and returns of livestock enterprises as well as of
crops.
When farms in each tenure group were d ivided into class intervals
of total annual inputs, the proportion of livestock farms falling into
the lower total annual input categories was lower than either 00
or CSC farms. The proportion of farms in the lower categories was
similar for CSC and 00 farms (Table 1). For example, only 52 percent of the LS farms had annual inputs under $15,000 while this percentage was 69 and 75, respectively, for 00 and CSC farms. The proportion of LS farms having annual inputs of $30,000 and over (17
percent) was significantly greater than the small proportion (3 percent) of CSC farms falling into this category.
5 Details on sampling procedure, size of sample,
and survey procedures are
give n in Appendix A.
0 Miller, Chryst, and Ottoson. Op. Cit. p. 334.
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Table I. P ercent Distribution of Farms Within Tenure Group, by Total Annual
Input per Farm
Tenure type and numbe r of fa rms

Annual

00

inputs
( 1956)

(157)

(Dollars)
Below
5,000
5- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-24,999
25-29,999
30,000
and over

8*LS5
37*LS1
24*CSC5
12
9
3

All

100

7

I

csc

( 167)

I

LS

(104)

All
farms
(428)

(Percent )
4

36
35
9

11

2
3*Ll
100

l *CSC5
l S*CSC I
33*00 5
15
10

4

6

32
31
12
10
3

17
100

8
100

• Significant differen ces in proportions, between tenures; LS refe rs to livestock share , CSC
to crop share, and 00 to owner-operator; digit foll owing the le tters is th e probability level.
a Crop inputs is the sum of (1) fixed cost (inventory va lue of land and crop buildings at
6 percent, minus rental val ue of rotation and perma nent pasture; depreciation and inte rest
o n in ven tory value of crop machinery at 26 percent; de preciation o n value of crop buildings
at 5 percent; operator and fami ly labor at $40.00 per week; ) plus the variable costs (fertilizer,
seed , li me, seed trea tment, custom work hired, crop building repa irs, h ired crop la bor, tractor
fue l, oi l, grease, mach inery and tru ck re pair, crop electricity, and othe r m iscellaneo us ex pe nses).
Property taxes, insurance, and inte rest on borrowed fund s are excluded.
Li vestock inputs is th e sum of (I) fixed costs; 6 perce nt of average in ven tory value o f
livestock, average inventory value of feed ; and of in ven tory val ue of li vestock buildings; de preciation o n l ivestock build ings at 5 percent; de preciation and in terest on li vestock machine ry
and eq uipment at 26 percent; operator and family labor on li vestock at ·40.00 pe r week; rental
va lue of rotation and permanent pasture; plus (2 ) variable costs: farm produced feed fed,
total livestock bought; vete rinary and breeding fees, l i,,estock building repairs, li vestock fuel ,
oil and m achinery and truck repair, li vestock electricity, total co mmercial feeds fed , hired
livestock labor. and miscellaneous.
W he n crop and livestock expenses are summed for the firm th e value of farm feed fed
is subtracted from the total, to remove the duplication.

Total acres per farm differed between tenures but the d ifferences
disappeared when farms were sorted by total inpu t per farm . 00 farms
(204 acres) were smaller than both the CSC (237 acres) and LS farm s
(280 acres) (Table 2).7 But the difference in to tal acres between CSC
(247 acres) and LS (284 acres) was not significant for farms with
$ 10-1 5,000 annual input (Table 3). T h e difference in farm acreage
between tenures was not significant at the 5 percent level of probability
for farms with .$ 15-30,000 annual input. H owever, we recogni zed that
the number of observations is sma ll a nd the standa rds of signi ficant
high.
T h ere were also fewer significant d ifferences in average crop
acres per farm when inputs were held equal b etween tenu res (Table
3). The fact of fewer significant differences between selected items for
tenure groups when total input was held equal between tenures
suggests the hypothesis that some of the problems of farm organization and operation are capital-oriented.
7 Dorwin Williams
a nd Frank Miller. Land T enure A rrangem en ts in Relation
lo Scale of Farming Operations and R esource Use in the Marshall Soils Areas of
Northwest Missouri ancl Adjoining States. Missouri Agricultural Experime n t Station .
Research Bulletin 809. July, 1962.
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Table 2. Comparison of Selected Mean Values of Size, Out put, Capital and Income
for Different Tenures
Tenure type
llem

Total acres, farm "
Acres cropland"
Total PMWU accomplished•
Gross farm ou tput, $ 0
Total capital investment, S•
Operators' net worth, $d
Net farm income, $0

All

00

csc

LS

farms

204
140
227
11,324
55,076
27,659
5,627

237
188
276
12,162
61,414
15,796
6,561

280
203
360
17,374
81,177
16,333
9,650

235
174
293
13,504
63,803
21,639
6,956

• R ecombined from Missouri analyses as reported in Darwin Williams
Scale of Farming
O perations and R esource Use Under Alternative Land Tenure Arrangements. Unpublished

Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Missouri, 1962.
11

Significantly different at I percent probability level.

b 00 versus CSC, and versus LS differ significantly at I percent level of probability.
c 00 versus LS share, and CS versus LS differ significantly at I percent level of probability.
d 00 differ from CSC and from LS at I percent level, and CSC differ from LS at 5 percent
level of probability. All tests of difference by value o[ t.

Statistical note : The sig nificance levels in this table and others in this publication cannot
properly be viewed col1ectively to make any judgment on "pooled" or overall differences between
groups, since two or more individual characteristics may have common components of variance.
Therefore, significance levels must be evaluated independently for each characteristic for which
differences between m eans are tested.

The distribu tion of operators b y age, within class intervals of
total annual input, demonstrates that th e smaller businesses are operated by older m en (Table 4a). Farms with inputs under $10,000 were
skewed toward older operators, whereas in the $15-30,000 input group
of farms nearly equal percentages fell in each age group. In the
$10-15,000 group of farms there were more operators under 40 than
for these with less than $10,000 input. T his results partly from the fact
that OOs tend to h ave smaller farms than do tenants (Table 5).
For these comparisons of age distribution, tenants older th an 54
were excluded because OOs over 54 were excluded in the sampling
process. This was done to reduce the effects of age (and consequently
family cycle) on oth er variables.
Tables I to 5 indicate that tenant operators manage larger businesses than do OOs, younger operators are tenants more frequently
than they are owners, a nd the age distribution of tenants is skewed
toward younger operators. These differences cannot be attributed to
the effect of kinship; closely related tenant-landlord firms were excluded
from the sample to remove the confounding affect of family relationships on other variables.
OOs were employed off-farm more frequently than were tenants
(Table 6), and the operators of smaller farms h ad income from
off-farm work more frequently than did operators of large farms-with
size m easured in total a nnual input. Also, of the OOs with less than
$ 10,000 of a nnual inputs a larger percentage h ad incomes of more
than $1,000 per year from off-farm work tha n did OOs of large farms
or tenant operators.
The tendency of OOs of small farms to seek off-farm work, while
tenants increase their incomes by operating larger farm businesses is
7

Table 3. Comparison of Selected Mean Inp ut and Output Values for Different Tenures, and Two Levels of Total Annual Input.
Farms with $ 15,000-$30,000
total annua l input

Farms wilh $ 10,000-$ 14,999
total annua l input

Tenure

Item

r:;:,

00

Number of cases
Total annual input ($)
Gross returns ($)
Tota l feed fed (.$)
Machinery investment ($)
Land and building value ($)
Land and building /acre ($)
Value all labor ($)
Value crop production ($)
Livestock returns ($)
Tenant returns ($)
Landlord returns ($)
Tenan t expense ($)
Landlord expense ($)
Acres, farm
Acres, cropland

12,1 85
14,240
5,787*CSC
6,117*LS
40,540*CSC
207
2,474
7,292*CSC
9,048*CSC

205*CSC
150*CSC

i

Tenure type

type

csc
12,526
13,7 18
4,106*LS
6,3 14* LS
49,207
207
2,537
8,933
5,477
9,549
4,168
9,243
3,283
247
192** LS

I

12,582
15,072
5,643*CSC
4,245
48,765**00
190
2,572
7,642**00
7,463*00
8,038
7,034
7,093
5,489
284*00
165 *00

'* Differs at J percent level of probabi lity from 00 == owner operators, CSC :=crop-share
Sig nificant differe nces between g roups, by t tesl.

*'"'

Differs at 5 percent level of probabi l ity.

00

LS

I

19,964
18,938
9,767**CSC
9,324
55,411 **CSC
219
3,087
10,277**CSC
10,384

278
184*CSC

tenant, LS = livestock-share

csc
20,037
21,954
7,742
8,980
67,033**LS
236
3,137
l 3,105
9, l 18
15 ,992
5,962
15 ,431
4,606
295
248
tenant farms.

I

LS

20,834
22,795**00
8,496
7,401 *" 00
63,928
238
2,987
11 ,496
9,543
11 ,859
10,937
l l .2 10
9,625
292
223*CSC

Table 4a. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Age Group, by Levels of
Annual Input.

Age
(yea rs)

Under 30

30- 34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50- 54
Average

S

I

Total a nnu al input p er farm.

10,00014,999 '

U nd er. 10,000

15,00U129,999

30,000
and over •

All

(percent)

(perce nt)

(perce nt)

(perce nt)

(per ce nt)

22
32
20
31
40
48
34

50
35
40
28
28
23
31

19
20
29
30
24
27
26

9
13
11
11
8
2
9

100
100
100
100
JOO

100
100

• One or more significant difference in percen tages between age groups a t 5 percent level
of probability.

T able 4b. Percent Distribution of Operators in Input Interval, by Age Groups.
S T ota l annu al in p ut p er farm
Age

U nder 10,000

Under 30 *

30--34
35- 39*
40-44
45-49
50-54 *
All

I

10,00014,999

15,00029,000

30,000 +

Average

( percc :--: ! )

5
15
8
18
24
30

17
18
17
18
16

JOO

JOO

6
12
16
24
20
22
100

14

9
24
18
24
18
7
100

8
16
14

20
21
21
100

• One or more significant differences between percentages of age gro up in different intervals

of tota l input.

Table 5a. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Tenure, by Age Groups.
Ten ure type
Age

LS

Under 30*

30-34*
35-39*
40-44*
45-49*
50--54*
Ali

2
5
8
19
31
35
100

csc

00

Average

14

16
20
12
30
12

13
100

100

8
16
14
20
21
21
100

10
25
24
14

(percent)

JO

• One or more signi fi cant d ifferen ces in percentages, between tenu res, a t 5 percent level
of probability.

Table 5b. Percent Distribution of Operators Within Age Group, by Tenure.

Age

Under 30

30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50--54
Average

.

Te nure type

.

00

csc

9
13
22
39
62
67
41

44
55
58
24
24
21
35

(percent )

.

LS

All

47
32
20
37
14
12
24

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

• O ne or more sig nifi ca nt differences betwee n age gro u ps, at 5 percent level.
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an important finding. However it must also be noted that the sampling
process in the study excluded part-owners; undoubtedly in the area
studied there were many instances of owners who increased their size
of business by renting land. This omiss ion does not imply a lack of
importance of this tenure arrangement; it was simply felt that partowners could not be adequately treated within the limits of this study.
There were no significant differences between CSC a nd LS tenants
as to amount and frequency of off-farm work, bu t the CSC operators
with less than $10,000 input in their farm businesses worked off farm
more frequently than did those with business of $15,000 or m ore
annual input. This difference was significant at the 1 p ercent level
of probability. 8
Expenditures for fertil izer on cropland were the same per farm
for operators under different tenures within the sam e interval of total
input per year, but differed between levels of total annual input
(Table 7). This suggests that 00s follow the same cropping practices
as do tenants, but that resource combinations change as total in puts
increase.

Investments in Improvements
Significantly larger investments were made on 00 farms than on
tenant operated ones in the sample for dwellings and service buildings
during the period 1953- 1957. There were no significant differences
between tenures as to fences, terraces and waterways, legumes or pa sture improvements (Table 8).
Apparently, there are greater opportunities or incent ives for investment in buildings on 00 farms-where the operator pays the costs
and receives the benefits-than on tenant operated ones, on which there
are problems resulting from length of occupancy and cost-return
sharing. This does not imply that effective arrangements can not b e
developed for improvements on tenant operated farms . R a ther, customary rental arrangements do not encourage them. In the individu al
Table 6. Percent Distribution of Operators With No Work Off the Far m, W i th
Less Than $1,000 Off-Farm Income and With More Than $1,000 Income From
Work Off Farm, by Tenure and by Total Annual Inputs per Fann.

I

Percent of operators b y inter vals of incom e from o ff -farm work
Annual
ca pital
input

Under $ 10,000
$ 10- 14,999
$ !5- 29,999
Over $30,000

All

Own er o perators
None
a

I$1,000
Under I Over
$ 1,000
1

I

Crop-share-cas h
None
a

I$1,000 SI ,ooo
Under \ O ver

L ivesto ck sh are
Non e

Is 1.ooo ls 1,ooo
U nder 1 O ver

(percent )

51
79
89
82
69*CSC

18
]!

ll
0
13

31
10
0
18
18

75
83
98
100
84* 00

13
12
0
0
9

12
5
2
0
7

85
74
87
95
84* 00

15
20
3
0
10

0
6
JO

5
6

a One or more sign ifi ca nt difference at 1 percent level of probability between
"' Own ers differ from tenants at 1 percnt leve l of probability .

intervals

Additional discussion of this point is found in Williams and Miller

Op Cit .

8
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Table 7. Percent Distribution of Farms by Dollars Fertilizer on Cropland, by Tenure and by Total Annual Input per Farm.
Total ,rnnual inputs, dollars
Under $ 10,000

Amount
spent on
fertilizer,
per
farm

I

$ 10- 14,999

$ 15-29,999

$30,000+

Tenure type and number of farms

I

00

(72)

I

csc
(65)

I

LS
(20)

00

(38)

csc
(59)

I

LS
(35)

I

00

(36)

csc
(38)

LS
(31)

34
24
32
JO

42
35
23
0

00
(11)

I

csc
(5)

(18)
LS

(per cent)

None*
.$300 or Jess*
$301-$1,000*
More than $1,000

71
23
6
0

71
21
8
0

'* One or more significant difference in

70
25
5
0

47
32
21
0

44
34
22
0

37
46
17
0

31
36
33
0

percentages between input intervals, J percen t level of probability.

45
28
18
9

60
0
40
0

17
22
50
11

T able 8. Average Expenditure During 1953 to 1957 on Improvements by T enure
Class."

Improvements

Dwelling househ
Service bu ildings•
Fences
Terraces and waterways
Legu mes
Pastu re
Drai nage"
Total imp rovemen ts •
Non-dwellin g•
Dwelling and service
bu ildings•
Lan d imp rovements
Total expenses
acre•

I

00

csc

LS

No.
farms

I Average

N o.

farms

I Average

139
139
138
138
139
138
139
136
136

$1090
11 41
365
395
474
117
142
3704
2617

109
109
109
106
111
111
106
97
99

$ 469
426
352
291
455
28
11 5
2100
1658

52
52
51
53
54
54
54
48
49

$ 805
757
565
391
507
17
209
3026
2400

139
136

2230
1111

206
101

916
876

51
50

1592
11 32

136

20

97

9

48

11

No .
farm s

Average

a Average for totals or aggregates are for only those cases reporti ng all items inclu d ed
in the tota l or aggrega te .
b Means significan tl y differen t at the 5 percent level of probability.
• Means sign ifica ntly different at th e I p ercent level of probability.
d Includes m iscellaneous expenditures on improvements.
Source: Pau l W . Barkley an d Wilfred H. Pine. Effects of T en u re on F arm I mprovemen ts.
Ka nsas Agricultural Experimen t Station , Bull etin N o . 454 , 1963.

case, improvem ents m ade by eith er the owner or the ten a nt opera ted
farm m ay depend on capital ava ilabi lity. Bu t the pooled resources of
landlord and tenant do not necessarily exceed those of an 00 . Furtherm ore, m onetary r eturns from improvements to buildings are n o t
as direct or possibly as favorab le as are those from o th er inputs in
th e sam e firm. In h ou sing p articularly, th e investmen t resul ts in sa tisfaction for the occupant, but m ay no t affect the gross farm returns.
T h e analysis of improvem ents also included th e effects of cos tsharing arrangem ents, compensa tion provisions, length of lease, continu a tion clau ses, and provisions fo r removal of improvem en ts a t
term ination, to ascer tain wh ether these terms of leases influenced the
level of improvem ent expenditures. The m os t impressive find ing was
the general lack of spec ific arrangements to deal wi th improvemen ts
on ren ted farms. R ela tively few leases h ad provisions on these item .
T he interview did no t inqui re into th e fu rther detail as to wh ether
separ ate and additional n ego ti a tion provided th e basis of decision on
improvem ent expendi tures; the com par isons were made on th e basis
of wh eth er ther e were su ch provisions in the lease. Also, th e comparisons wer e m ade within lease types rather th an between ten ures.
Aver age exp enditures p er farm fo r th e selected types of improvements seldom d iffered signi fica ntly, regardless of th e pr esence or lack
of a provision for th em in th e lease. M ean exp end i tures for drainage
were larger (at 1 p ercent level of pro babili ty) wh en the landlord su pplied m a terials an d the tenant did th e work th an for farms with n o
sharing arrangem ents. Also, improvem ents to terraces and waterways
wer e larger for fa rms with cost-sh aring arrangem en ts th an for th ose
12

with none. There were no significant differences in, improvements associated with the presence of compensation provisions. Only six percent
of the crop-share leases and nine percent of livestock share leases
had them.
Expenditures on dwellings and fences were larger for farms with
continuation clauses in the lease than for those without such clauses.
But there were no significant differences in expenditures for improvements on rented farms as influenced by provisions for removal of
improvements, length of lease, written or oral leases, acreage in farm,
farm income, income from off-farm employment, or the financial condition of the farm as reflected by the ratio between assets and liabilities.
Several of these findings are contrary to what would reasonably be
expected. Presumably, expenditures for improvements would be larger
when costs were shared or when other provisions affecting the incidence of costs or benefits for improvements were included. Possibly the
presence or absence of a provision in the lease is not an adequate b as is
of comparison. The details might be negotiated by the two parties
as an addition to and separate from the fact of the original agreement.

lmput Combinations
Comparisons between 00, CSC, and LS farms showed significant
differences between these groups as to average inputs of crop acres, machinery investment, r eal estate value, and feed fed (Tables 2-3). They
also differed as to fertilizer on corn, variable crop inputs per cultivated acre, percentage of cropland in forage, distribution of types of
livestock, and expenditures for improvements. These differences suggest that inputs are not allocated the same on farms of different tenure
types. But evidence is lacking that the tenure form is responsible for
the differences; further, differences in allocation of inputs does n ot
necessarily imply a difference in efficiency in the use of resources.
Analysis of variance was used to test for differences between tenures
as to intensity of crop production, measured in dollars worth of commercial fertilizer used per acre on corn, and total variable crop expense
per cultivated acre. Significantly less fertilizer was used on corn acres
on LS farms ($2.95 per acre) than on 00 farms ($4.07 per acre) or
on CSC leased farms ($4.37 per acre). 9 OOs had significantly higher
variable inputs per cultivated acre ($ 14.53) than did LS farms ($ 11.66)
or CSC farms ($10.27). Also, OOs had a significantly larger percentage

9 But livestock share farms
had th e highest corn yield per acre-52 bushels,
which differs at the 5 percent level of probabibility from average yield for OOs at
46 bushels, but not from crop-share tenants at 49 bushels.
Source: Darwin Williams Unpublished data, Department of Agricultural Economics. University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
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(28.7) of seeded acres in forage crops than did the other tenures-23.7
for LS and 17.8 for CSC. 10 (All differences significant at 1 percent.)
Levels of inputs differed between farms within tenure groups.
Some of the differences are tenure-oriented, but others are not. The
analysis of input use within tenure categories is given below.

Owner-Operators
Neither intensity of cropping practice nor intensity of livestock
production were affected significantly by the variations in finan cial
positions of OOs. Multiple linear regression of fertilizer p er acre of
corn (as a measure of cropping intensity) on cash and securities owned,
per crop acre, liabilities per crop acre (with real estate excluded), and
percentage of real estate encumbrance resulted in a coefficient of
determination of .06. That is, these variables explain only a nominal
portion of the variation in use of fertilizer on corn. Likewise, multiple linear regression of total variable expenses per cultiva ted acre
(as another measure of intensity of cropping) on the same variables
shows that only .04 of the variation in expenditures per crop acre
are explained by these measures of fin ancial position.
Similar regressions for the value of commercial feed fed per animal
unit, and of total variable livestock expenses per animal unit, both
used as measures of livestock intensity, which were run on the same
measures of financial position explained only about 1 percent of the
variations in these inputs between farms. Additional analysis by regression gave r esults that showed only a small portion of the variation in
percentage of investment in m ajor livestock enterprises was expla ined
by cash assets and liabil ities of OOs. These findings were in terms of
groups of farms. It does not follow, of course, that an individ ual farm
is unaffected by lack of capital or by over-encumbrance. 11

Crop-share Cash Farms
Analysis of the effects of differential shares of product and of shares
of cost vs. sh ares of return is made difficult by the differences in sharing
between crops. Shares of all products are seldom the sam e; the prevailing tendency is for the share of corn to differ from the share of
oats; cash rent is usually paid on pasture and frequently on h ay.
Several va riable costs, such as tractor fuel, are seldom shared, but
nearly all returns are shared. Thus, there are too few leases wi th
equal product shares, or with the share of each variable cost equal
to the share of product to wh ich it contributes, for careful comparison
for equ al sh aring vs. differ ential sharing.
10 Murray Corm ack. Th e Effects of Alternative Tenure A rrangements on I n tratemporal R esource Allocations ancl Enterprise Selection . Unpubl ished Master 's
Thesis. University of Nebraska, 1960.
11 I bicl.
.
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A linear regression of dollars per acre of variable crop costs on
percentage of total variable crop expense paid by the landlord gave
a coefficient of determination indicating that 61 percent of the variat ion
in total variable crop expense per acre is explained by variation in
percentage of crop costs paid by the landlord. Tests of differences in
percentages of cultivated acres in row crops, and in percentage of total
variable crop expense per cu ltivated acre, between farms with equal
shares vs. those with different shares of all crops showed little evidence
of significant difference (i.e., a significant difference at a probability
level of 10 percent). Analysis of variance for differences in percentages
of cu ltivated acres in row crops depending on whether tenant or landlord made the decision on acreages of crops, and likewise for differences
between total dollars of variable crop expen ses per acre when one or
the other party made the decision, showed no significant differences. 12
Cobb-Douglas production functions were computed for two gro ups
of farms-those sharing crop products alike and those with differential
shares within farms . Farms were paired between groups, to hold total
annual value of inputs approx imately equal and thus to remove the
probable effect of differences in quantities of inputs. As a check, the
value of crop production (dependent) was regressed on crop acres,
weeks of crop labor, crop machine services, and miscellaneous crop
expenses. T h ere were no significant differences between the two groups
at the 5 and 10 percent level of probability. 13
Few tenants expressed belief that differential sharing affected crop
combinations, and th e tests used found no significant differences.
Differential sharing apparently is not an important determinant of
croppng pattern.
Comparable functions for crop production were also computed for
both CSC and LS leases, with division within tenure made on the basis
of equal or different sh are of total value of selected items of expense
vs. share of crop return. This basis of grouping was the only feas ibl e
one, because few farms met the full condition of sharing all variable
expenses and sharing them in th e same proportion as returns. There
were no significant differences between farms with like and with unlike
sharing at the 5 or 10 percent level of probability.

Livestock-share Leases
Linear regression and analysis of varia n ce were used to test for
differences within LS leases. A linear regression of value of total variable crop expenses per acre cu lti vated on percentage of total crop
expe nse paid by the landlord indicated that about 12 percent of the
var iation in variable crop costs is explained by variation in percentage
Ib id .
John Timoth y Sanderson , R elativ e Efficien cy of A lternative Ten ure Arrangeme nts, U npublished Master of Scie nce Thesi s, Iowa State University, 1960. See
Appendix B for detail on Cobb-Douglas model.
12

13

15

of costs paid by the land lord. Analysis of var iance was used to test fo r
differences in type of livestock ra ised on farms (1) where the landlord
made the decision on livestock type, (2) those where the tenant made
the choice, and (3) both made this decision jointly. The p ercentage
of animal units in feeder cattle was significantly higher (at 5 percen t
level of probability) when the landlord made the decision than when
tenants did, but no further test was made to determine the effect of
capital availability on choice of type of livestock. In short, resource
combinations on LS farms are essentially the same whether product
shares are the same or different, whether or not shares of cost are the
same as shares of returns, and whether selected management decisions
are made by either party or jointly. 14
It may well be noted, however, that differential sharing is a customary practice which m ay be accepted without question because it
is customary. Further, differential sharing of returns is accompanied
by differential sharing of expenses, and the cost sharing may offset
the effect in returns sharing. From the several limitations in the data
available, as well as from the strong logical base in theory to the effect
that differential sharing will cause either transfers in income between
parties or departures from optimum combination of inputs, the results
of this study leave room for doubt as to actual effect of differenti al
sharing in current leases.

Value of Land and Buildings
Although average value of land and buildings per acre varied
little for the three tenures- OOs, $195 ; CSC, $203; LS, $214; and all
farms $204-the distribution of farms by ranges in value per acre
differed between groups. T here were more 00 farms in the lower valu e
range. 15 Thus, 36 percent of OOs had farms valued at $150 or less per
acre, compared with 24 percent for CSC and 17 percent for CSC and
17 percent for LS farms (Table 9).
Table 9. Percent Distribution of Farms by Value of Real Estate Per Acre, for
Each Tenure Grou p.
Tenure
Value per acre
pe r fa rn1

$150 or less
$151-200
$201-250
$251-300
$301-350
$350+
All

00

csc

LS

All farms

(percent)

(percent)

(percent )

(per cent )

36*
23*
25
14
2
0
100

24*
34*
24
18
0
0
100

17*
32
33
14
3
l

100

27
29
26
16
2
0
100

• Difference within value interval significa nt between tenures at 5 percent probability.
u Murray Cormack, Op. Cit.
15 Although owner-operated farms had larger expenditures on improvemen ts
than did tenant operated ones (Table 8) the difference was no t large enough to
skew the distribution away from the low value interval. Also, buildings account for
a sm aller portion of farm value than does land .
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Valu e of la nd a nd buildings per acre did n o t differ between ten ures
wh en farms were gro uped b y total cap ital inputs per year. But valu es
per acre were higher for the farms in the $15,000-3 0,000 capital interval
than for those in the $ 10,000-1 5,000 interval (Ta ble 3) .
Annu al cost of real es tate (est ima ted h ere at 6 percent of value
r epor ted by opera tors) as a percentage of to tal annual inputs did not
differ be tween tenures, when fa rms were grouped by intervals of
annu al input. Nor did th e percentages differ significa ntly between
inter vals. For farm s within input intervals the percentages which lan d
and building cost represented of total an nu al cost were:
$ 10,000-14,999
$ 15,000-30,000
inpu t
input
16
00
20
20
csc
23
18
LS
23
R eal esta te is the largest item of cap ital inves tm en t on most
farms. In special cases of in tens ive livestock operat ions, the li vestock
input might exceed that of real estate, but then nearly the whole
livestock input " turn s over" a nnu all y. T h e annu al cost of la nd a nd
buildings is frequently exceed ed b y other inputs.

Ill. INCOME EFFECTS OF TENURE ARRANGEMENTS
T h e preceding comparisons and ana lyses were in terms of se lected
characteristi cs of farms or of operators, with the object ive of explor ing
differences in size of business and input combinations. ALtention is
now directed to the income effects of these and other differences
between and within tenure groups. More specificall y, do the differences
between combinations of factors result in differences in efficiency of
resource use? Do reso urce owners receive the marginal value products
of the resources they contr ibute to the farms they operate? The evidence marshalled here suggests tha t current leas ing practices have I ittle
effect on efficiency of reso urce use-00s and tenants follow the same
farm ing practices-but there are income transfers b e tween parties to
some leases .

Factor Productivity
Production functio n s of th e Cobb-Douglas type were used to Lest
differences between groups of farms.
Separate funct ion s for crop
a nd livestock were comp uted for fa r ms in each ten ure group ancl for
all farms in the sample, to remove the compo unding effect of croplivestock relations within firms.
Marginal valu e prod ucts were esti-

1•

See Appendix for detail of content and method.
The elasticity of production of land is not a direct funct ion of th e pri ces of
hogs or beef, as is assumed if crops and livestock are combined in on e production
function for the farm firm. Instead, the productivity of land is a funct ion of the
value of products from land and of tb e qualities and quantities of inputs combined
with i t.
17
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mated from the computed coefficients, and these were compared with
thei r respective factor prices or opportunity costs. In general, the evid en ce suggests that there is nothing in any of these tenure forms in
pract ice that makes one superior to another in use of reso urces.
There were few significant d ifferences between elasticities in either
the crop or the livestock functions (Tables 10, 11 and 12). None of the
elasticities for crop production differed between tenures at the 5
percent level of probability; only those for livestock inventory a nd
feeds fed d istinguis hed LS farms from CSC or 00 farms (Tab le 10).1 8
The fact that the sums of th e elast icities exceeded 1.00 in Tables J0
and 11 is indicative of slight ly increasing returns to scale in every case.
T he patter n of margin al ret urn s to resources used in livestock production on LS farms differed from that of th e other two ten ures. Marginal re tu rns to livestock inventory, livestock labor, a nd feeds feel fo r
LS farms d iffe red from those of CSC and 00 farms at either the one
or 5 percent leve l of probability Part of these differences may res ul t
from the larger q ua n tit ies of resources u sed. Also,cl ifferences b etween
selected mean valu es decrease when capita l inputs are held equal
between tenures (Table 3).
Comparisons of rat ios of marginal returns to opportunity cost of
resou rces show h igh returns to crop-land in all three ten u res a nd to
lives tock inventory for 00 and CSC farms; returns to labor are low.
Table JO. R egressio n Con st a n ts, P rod uc ti o n E lasticit ies, Geom etric Mean s of
P roduction Levels and R esource Inputs, and R elated Stat istics for Crop Estim atin g Equ ation s for Each o f Th ree Tenure C lasses, a nd th e T otal of A ll Farm s.

Item

I

00

Symbol

Average production ,
(Y)
($) / farm
(a)
Con stant
(X,)
Average cropland (acr es)
(b,)
elasticity
(X,)
Average crop Jahor (weeks)
(be)
elasticity
Average crop
(Xs)
machine services ($)
(b,)
clastic itv
Average m iscella neo us crop
(X ,)
cash expense ($)
(b ,)
e lastic ity
(~bi )
Sum of elasticities
(R")
Correlation index

csc

LS

All
farms

.552 1
12.1798
120.8
.905 1"
28 .8
- .0044

7803
9.3028
17 3.0
.75..J.7:l
335
.0 172

85 13
8.5 104
182.9
.8433"
32.4
.1245"

70 13
10.3271
153.6
.829 1"
31.4
.0230

1643
.2 185"

1887
.2-166"

2004
.1972"

1819
.2 125"

524
.0278
1.1 470
.8367

615
.1437"
1.1 622
.77 19

719
.0885 <
1.2536
.8412

602
.1054'
1.1699
.8294

1 S1g01ficantly
d1ffc1cnt fro m zero .lt th e J percent probability leve l.
b S1gmfica n tlv d 1ffe1e nt from zero at th e 5 percent probability lc\"el.
c S1g n1ficantl y dtffcrent fro m zero at the JO percent probability leve l.
All other b Ya lucs uonsign ih ca nt at pro babilit y leve ls of less than 40 percent. See Appendi x
B for regression equation.
Source: John T . Sanderson. Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arran ge ments. Unpub li shed Maste r's Thesis. Iowa State University
1960 p. 5 1.

" .J ohn T. Sanderson. O f>. Ci t.
1 " John T. Sanderson. OfJ. Cit., p . 60.
JS

Table 11. Regression Constants, Production Elasticities, Geometric . Means of Production Levels and Resource Inputs, and Related Statistics for the Livestock
Estimating Equation for Each of Three T enure Classes, and the Total of
All Farms.
Item

csc

00

Symbol

Average production,
(Y)
(S) / farm
Constant
(a)
Average livestock
inventory ($)
(X 1)
elasticity
(b,)
(weeks)
(X,)
Average livestock labor
e lasticity
(b2)
Average li vestock bui ld ings
and equipment (S)
(X,)
C'lasticity
(b3)
Average feeds fed ($)
(X,)
elasticity
(b,)
Average misce llaneous
livestock expense ($)
(X ,)
elasticity
(b,.)
elasticities
Sum of
(~b ,)
(R 2)
Correlation index

All
far m s

LS

4633
1.0405

3+93
1.45+ 1

8308
2.2468

4778
1.2554

4640
.4297"
22.3

39-10
.4920"
22.1

870+
.1 288
28.9

5069
.4279"
23.7

- .030+

.0243

.1780

.032 1

,128+
- .0043
3826
.5048"

3770
-.0999
2969
.42,j3"

4935
-.1 l+l"
5989
.905 1"

42 17
-.06-15°
3862
.5 173"

394
.1 236°
1.0234
.7785

378
.1783"
1.0200
.8017

6 15
-.0706
1.0272
.6704

432
.1250"
1.0378
.778 1

Significantl y diffe re nt from zero at the I percent probability level.
Significa n tly different from zero a t th e 5 percen t p robab ility level.
Signifi cantl y differe nt from ze ro at the JO percent p roba bility level.
See Appendi x B for regress io n equation.
Sou rce: John T. Sanderson . R e/alive Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arrnagements
1ish ed Master's Thesis. Iowa State University
I 960. p. 52.
:i

h
c

Unpub-

Table 12. Values o( t for D ifferences in Productio n Elastic ities Between T en ure
Classes.
Inpu t categori es

I

00

VS.

csc

00

\'S.

LS

csc

vs. LS

CrufJ J1rudu clio11 elasticities

C ropland
Crop labor
Crop ma ch ine ser vices
Miscellaneous crop cash expense
Lives/ark produ ction elasticities
Livestock in vento ry
Livestock labor
Li vestock bui ldings and eq uipment
Feeds fed
Miscellaneous livestock cash expense

1.58
.3-1
.3'[
1.95 '

.62
1.75'
9,_
:,

.87
1.35
.57

.85

.9 1

.55

2.26"
1.37
1.26
2.52"
1.67°

2.87"
1.06
.16
3.19"
1.93"

.45
.99
.6-1
.5 1

Signifi ca ntly different al 1hc 1 percent probability level.
Signifi ca ntly differen t at the 5 percent probability level.
c Signi fica ntl y different al the JO perce n t probabi lity lcu:! I.
All o th er differe n ces no n significa nt at p robabi lity levels of 20 pe rcent or less.
b iJ -b ik
\•\ /here b i is the regression <:odfi c:cnt for th e it h resource, j and k
t==
5 1, - bik
ar,e tenure cla sses, and th e divi sor is the sq uare roor. of t he sum of
,·arianccs.
IJ

=1

b

Source: J o hn T. Sande rson. Relative Efficiency of .Alternative
T enure Arrangements
Unpublished Master;s Thesis. Iowa State Un iversity. 1960. p. 56.
Editor
n ote: The above t test ma y not be consistent with the F test that wou ld result
from 1hc application o( a likelihood ratio pri n ciple. T hi s app lies also to Table 13
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Table 13. Margin al R eturn / Opportu nity Cost Ratios at the Geometric Means of
R esources and Production £or Each Tenure Class
00

csc

2.84
-.02
.73
.29

2. 3-i
.1 0
1.02
J.82

2.70
.82
M
1.05

4.30
- .1 6
.00
.61
1.45

4.40
.I O
- .82
.50
1.65

1.20
1.28
-1.73
1.26
-.95

Jn p u t ca tegory

Crop resources
Cropland
Crop labor
Crop m achi ne services
M iscell aneou s crop expense
Livestock resources
Livestock inventor y
Livestock labor
Lives tock buildin gs and eq u ip men t
Feeds fed
M iscellan eou s lives tock ex pense
a T he op po r tu n it y costs used

LS

we re :

S 14 .56 per acre for cro pl and
$40.00 per week for crop a nd li,·cstock labo r
10 percen t of li vestoc k in ve nt o r y
J I percen t of li vestock b uil d in gs a nd eq ui p m en t.
Do llars ex pended for crop mach ine services, mi scell aneou s crop ex pense, feed s fed , and
miscell a n eo us l ivestock expense.
Source: Jo h n T. Sanderson. Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure Arrangements. Unp ubl is hed Ma ster's T h esis. Iowa State University. 1960. p. 62.

T able 14. Va lues of t fo r Differences Between Margina l R eturns to Crop an d Livestock Resources and the R esource Prices for Each T enure Class."
In p u t category

Crop resources
Cropla nd
Crop labor
Crop machi ne servcies
Miscell aneous crop expe nse
L ivestock resources
Livestock inventory
Livestock labor
Livestock bui lding-s and eq uipm ent
Feeds feel
Miscellaneous livestock expense

00

csc

8.78"
5.42"
1.37
1.37

6.18"
3.13"
.08
1.95d

6.97"
.45
.60
.08

3.81"
2.42c
1.54
3.33"
.58

5.01"
2.86"
3.09"
5.24"
.82

.20
1.01
3.14"
1.43
1.50

LS

Significantly different at the 1 percent probability le\'el.
c Significantly different at th e 5 percent probabili1y level.
Significantly differe nt at th e 10 percent probability level.
~'ft-Pi
\ Vherc .\Ii is Lh e marginal r eturn of the i th 1·esourcc at t h e geometric
mean, P i is the opportunity cost a nd Sm 1 is t h e square root of 1h e
t=
Smi
va riance of th e marginal r e turn .

b
d

00 and CSC fa rms were li mited in land and lives tock capital. Under
LS leasing, marginal ret urn s to labo r did n ot differ from its opportu n i ty
cost; only m arginal retu rn s to crop-land and to li vestock buildings and
equ ipment d iffe red from their opportuni ty costs (Tables 13 a nd 14).20
The produ cti on funct io n analyses indicated that land is limiting
in all three ten ures-bu t more so for 0 0s-and that LS te n ants were
relatively m ore efficien t in use of reso urces.

Returns-Expense Ratios
00 fi rms as a grou p h ad lower earning r atios per dollar of input
th an did eith er of the leased firms as groups. When dollar value of
20

See John T. Sanderso n . Op Cit. pp. 128-130.
20

total returns per farm was divided by total input per farm, and the
resulting ratios were averaged, leased farms had earning ratios higher
than 00 farms (Table 15). But only the LS firms had significantly
higher ratios (Table 16).
The difference between ratios for 00s and for leased farms may
arise from the combina tions of inputs used or from combinations of
products. But th e differences b etween groups as to returns-expense
ratios do not necessarily imply a difference in efficiency in use of
r esources.
Table 15. Earning/ Expense Ratios for Firms, Operators, and Landlords b y Tenure
Class.
Tenure class

00

Firm

Operator

Landlord

99.8
100.6
108.7

134.0
125.6

99.8

csc

107.4

LS

114.0

See footnote to Table 1 for expla n ation of annual inputs a nd returns.

Table 16. R esults of Tests of Significance of Difference Between Earning Ratios.•
Tenure group tested

Probability
Level

Value of
t

00 vs. CSC firm
00 vs. LS firm
CSC-tenant vs. LS-tenant firm
Landlord vs. tenant:"
CSC firm s
LS firms
Landlord vs. firm"
CSC firm s
LS firm s

.79
3.34
.59

.01

2.42
.98

.02

"

1.90
1.15

a

*

*
*

t ==
mea n I - m ea n 2
square root of [pooled variance (111
n 2) / 111 n 2]
• not significant at 5 percent level of probability
b Editors note: lnsofar as joint var ian ce may exist between data for landlords, tenants, a nd
firms, the validity of the t test as used here is open to question.

+

Table 17. Earnings/ Expense R atios for Firms With $10,000 to $14,000 of Total
Inputs and for Firms With $15,000 to $30,000 of Total Inputs by Tenure Groups.•
Tenure g rou p s

Total firm ex p ense

$ 10,000
to

$ 15,000
to
$30,000

$14,999
Average return per expen se ratio

00 firms
CSC firm s
Tenan ts'
Landlords'
LS firms
Tenants'
Landlords'

Percen t

11 7.8
109.5
103.9
135.4
119.7
116.l
130.1

95 .3
108.l
101.7
135 .l
110.5
107.7
119.0

a These ratios do not quite agree with values obtained by divid ing appropriate returns
by ex penses 1n Table 3 because these a re computed as a mean of the sum of r atios for
individua l fa rms in the group.
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CSC landlords earned significantly more per dolla r of input
than did their tenants, but there was no significant difference between
LS landlords and their tenants (Table 16). Nor did landlord ratios
differ from firm ratios at the 5 percent level of probability. In terpretative comments on these results are given on pages 32 and 33.
Earning ratios also differed between tenures when farms were
sorted by intervals of total inputs (Table 17). But none of the differences within the $10- 14,999 capital interval were significant, except
those for tenants vs. landlords in CSC leases (Table 18). The difference
between OOs and LS tenant firms was significant a t the 5 percent
level of probability for farms in the $15-30,000 input grou p, and the
ratios for landlords were significantly larger than those for tenants
only in the CSC firms.
The lack of significant differences between landl ords and tenants
under LS leases warrants comment. The test of significance as such
says that in repeated sampling, d ifference of the am ounts found could
be expected-that is, the difference is not large enough to exceed
sampling varition. A more important question to a lan dlord and a
tenant may be one of how large a percentage difference has meaning
to them, if they are aware of differences. Any calculated d ifference of
more than 1 percent might be grounds for dissatisfaction if they are
aware of such a difference.
Although there are few significant differences between tenures in
the means of the return-expense ratios per farm and only the means
for CSC farms differ between landlord and tenant, the dis tribution
of ratios within tenure groups do d iffer. The percentage of fa rms with
ratios less than 1.0 was significantly larger for OOs than for both CSC
and LS farms, and was also larger for CSC than for LS farms (Tabl e
19). Also, CSC tenants had ratios less than 1.0 more frequently than
did their landlords, and more CSC than LS tenants h ad ra tios less
than 1.0 (Table 19). LS tenants had ratios less than one more frequently
Table 18. Results of Tests of Significance of Difference Between E arning Ratios,
Between Tenure Grou ps, an d Between Landlords and Tenants.
Total firm inpu t

Tenure groups tested

10,000

$ 15,000

to

to

$14,999

$30,000
Value of t a

00 vs. CSC firm s
00 vs . LS firm s
CSC-tenant vs. LS -te nant firm s
Landlord vs. tenant
CSC firms
LS firms

1.102
.2 19
1.506

1.966
2.237 '
.385

-1.007"
l.620

3.352b
1.381

a Level of statistical sign ifi cance:
b Significantly different at the l percent probability level.
c Significantly different at the 5 percent probabilit y le ve l.
t=mean 1 - m ean 2
sq uare root of [pooled var iance ( n 1
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+ 11 2) /

111 11 2]

Table 19. Percentages of Farms, of Landlords, an d of T enants With ReturnsE xpense R a tios Less Than I.(), by T en ure.
Tenure

Percent of fa rms with ratio below 1

00 firm s

53"

CSC firm s

42b
22

Landlo rd
Tena n t

57'
27

LS firms
Land lord
Tenant

26
40"

a Larger than for CSC fi rm and landlord; LS fi rm, landlord, and tenant.
b Larger than for LS firm ; and landlord.
c Larger Lhan for CSC landlord; and LS tenant.
d Larger than for CSC landlo rd, and for LS firm and landlord.
All d ifferen ces significant at I or 5 percent level of pro babil ity. Test of difference in percentages from prepared tables, station circu lar No. 15 1, Washington

Agricultural Experimen t

Station , Pullman: June, 195 1; based on t test.

than did the farm firms which they operated. These d ifferences in
percentage of distribution of ratios within groups indicate that tenants
earn less per dollar of their inputs than do their landlords. Apparently
the wide range in ratios per farm, per operator, and per la ndlord in
each group accou nts for the lack of significant d ifferences in the means
for the gro ups.
T he estimated value of housing furnished the tenant and also the
00 and lancllords' expenditures on repair a nd improvement o f dwelling are excl uded from these cos t-return s data.

Income Transfers Between Parties to Leases
U ndoubtedly, som e of the differences b etween earn ing ra tios for
landlords a nd ten a nts result from the cost accounting used in this
study. L and was ch arged as a cost to th e firm b y tak ing six percent
of the estimated market value of the farm; a nd all estima tes of land
a nd building valu es were obtained from the operators. Any tendency
to underestim ate land values would thus underestimate landlord cost
a nd g ive landlords a higher returns expense ratio. But, as shown by
Table 3, Janel values per acre d id n ot differ ver y much between tenures. 00s reported much the sam e average values as did tenants.
Also, labor costs were entered at a standardized $40 per week, but labor
qualiLy undoubtedly varied b etween operators. Further, n o accou nt was
taken of cost or quality of the management input, which in effect
meant for this study that management was assumed as equal between
farm s a nd tenures.
Differences between earn ing ratios for landlords a nd tenants also
arise from the terms of the lease-th e shares, the i tems of expense
a n d the produ cts sh ared, the input structure, a nd from the p aym ents
made for inputs such as buildin gs and p astu re in the production of
products not sh ared. Yields and prices for the year 1957 might h ave
influenced the amount of income or value of product to b e d ivided,
but n ot the proportional sharing. From other studies it is known
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that rental terms change slowly. 21 Thus, the earning ra tios are n ot
necessarily unique for the year 1957.
All this suggests that the rental market was a landlord's market in
the study area. However, for the majority of tenan ts, this market m ay
be a better economic opportunity than owning their own farms. The
tenant under a CSC lease received a return of $1.006 per dollar of
annual input, compared with the OO 's $.998 (Table 15). O r the LS
tenant received $1.087 per dollar of his input, compared with $1.1 49
in the firm and $1.256 for th e landlord. In terms of earning ratios,
many tenants with their limited capital were better off than was the
00. But why do tenant earning ratios differ from those of landlords
or of the firm? At least part of the explanation r ests in the arrangements for sharing costs and returns. Shares differ within leases, as
shown by the following discussions of the two lease types.

Crop-share Cash Leases
Shares of cost differ from shares of return. The landlord's share of
crop returns exceeds his share of crop costs more frequent ly than h is
share of costs exceeds his share of returns. 22 Data from 167 CSC leases
were tabulated in percentage points of difference from equality; tha t
is, in selected intervals, percentage of return received by the landlord
minus percentage of cost paid by the landlord. In 5 percent of th e
leases, shares were equal, and in an additional 36 percent they were
within 5 percentage points of equal. But in nearly half of the leases,
landlord returns exceeded his share of cost and in 12 percent h is share
of costs exceed his share of returns by more than 5 percen tage points
(Table 20). The share of fixed crop costs equaled the share of variable
crop costs, which in turn equaled the share of returns fro m crops in
Table 20. Distribution of Differences Between Landlord Shares o f Costs and
Returns in CSC Leases.
Differ ence
betwee n
shares of
costs a nd

re turns

N umber of cases
w here sh are of
r eturn exceed s
share o f cost ,
for crops

N umber of cases
wh er e sha re of
cost exceeds
sh ar e of r etu rn ,

for crops

Perce n t

0-5
6-15
16-25
26+
All

Shar e of
cro p cost
vs. share
crop
retu r n s

Share of
fi xed cost
vs. sha re
varia bl e
cost

(P ercent of cases)

+
19
32
13
2
66·

+
17
10
2

+ or 41
42
15

29·

100

2

+ or 6
.. 11
27
56
100

a In 5 percen t o f leases shar es were equ al.
21 Walter
E. Chrys t and John F. Timmons. A djusting Farm Rents to Changes in
Prices, Costs, and Prod uction . Iowa Agri cultural Ex pe rim e n t Sta tion . Special R eport
N o. 9, 1955.
22 Th e costs referred to here include interest on in vestmen t a nd deprecia tion
on buildin gs cha rgeable to crop production , as well as cash costs.
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one CSC lease. The share of total crop costs differed from share of
total returns from crops by more t han 5 percentage points in 49 percent
of the leases, and shares of fixed cost differed from shares of variable
cost in 94 percent of CSC leases (Table 20). T hus, fixed costs apparently were balanced against variable costs to achieve equality of total
costs and returns. Such balancing can be one of the causes of income
transfers between parties, for dollar inputs in variable factors do not
contribute the same to the earnings of the firm as do dollars input of
fixed cost when the firm is not at its most profitable combination.
Landlords pay some of the fixed costs in all CSC leases. (Fixed
costs for livestock in this study includes a charge of 6 percent on the
value of livestock bu ildings as well as depreciation on livestock buildings.) But the differences between shares of fixed and variable costs
(Table 20) result from the customary practice of sharing selected costs
at standardized fractional shares-usually 50 percent. In value terms,
the fixed items supplied by th e landlord do not equal those furnished
by the tenant. Thus in many leases the shares of costs and returns
differ between the two parties because fixed costs in the firm are shared
on, say a 40-60 basis; all other shared costs may be divided in the
standard 50-50 pattern.

Livestock-share Leases
The percentage shares of costs and returns for individual enterprises differed from those of total costs and returns in the firm (columns
1, 5, and 8, T able 21). This is due to an apparent tendency for the
two parties to arrive at their sharing arrangement b y balancing different enterprise shares to arrive at total shares; also, part of this comes
about by the selection of specific items of costs which are shared. Costs
of tractor fuel for crop and livestock operations, for example, are
seldom shared. But most of the differences between landlords and
tenants in their shares of total costs and returns result from differences
in their shares of variable costs versus their shares of fixed costs.
(columns 6 and 7, Table 21) .
Only one LS lease had the same share throughout-with share of
fixed cost of crops equal to share of variable costs of crops equal to
share of fixed livestock equal to share of variable livestock equal to
share of returns.
The number and percentage of leases with the landlord's share of
livestock returns greater than his share of livestock costs is approximately the same as those with share of livestock costs greater than
share of total costs, and in turn greater than his share of the returns.
Five leases had equal shares (Table 21, columns 3 and 4).

Crop-share Cash and Livestock-share Leases
Differences between the share of costs and share of returns affect
resource combinations (particularly if the operator has the respon25

Table 21. Percent Distribution of Selected Landlord Shares in Livestock-Share Leases, by Intervals of Difference Between Shares of
Cost and Returns.
Difference
betw ee n
p e rcent
sh a res

"°

I
Share of firm
fi xed ex penses
vs. finn vari able
ex penses vs .
sh are of crop o r
li ves w ck return s

2

Sh are fi xed
li ves tock ex penses
vs . va ri a ble
li ves tock ex penses
vs . share of
li vesto ck r eturns

3

Sh are of
r eturn s
exceed s
sh are o f
co sts fo r
livestock

4
Share of
costs exceed s
sh a re of
r eturn fro m
li vestock

5
Sh are of
li vestock
ex penses vs.
sh a re o f
lives to ck return

6
Share of
fi xed crop
expenses vs.
vari a ble cro p
expenses

0,

Percent
points
0- 5
6- 15
16- 25
26+

+ or 15
50
24
11

100

-.., :> percent were equa l

+ or 14

46
25
15
100

+
33
17

2
52 *

+
25
14
2
2
43*

+ or 63
31

+ or 8
19

7

Share o f
crop cos ts
vs. crop
r eturns

+ or 22
45

+ or
44
43
10
3
100

4

25

17

2

48
JOO

16
.100

JOO

8

Shar e o f
fi xed
li vesto ck
ex p enses vs .
vari a ble
li vestock
ex pe nses

sibility for decision as to quanti ty of a var iable resource) or di stributio n
of earnings in th e fi rm . O f 89 op era tors who th ough t th at fer tili zer
application was inadequa te, 28 repli ed th at th e cost sh aring ar ra ngemen t was the reason for the de fi cien cy. Also, 24 op erators said th ey
woul d h ave u sed m ore weed spray if costs an d returns h ad b een shared
th e same. W h ether combinatio ns and o utpu t would actu ally h ave been
ch anged significantly on the sample farm s if there h ad b een n o restri ction s in leases and if sh ar es of cos t h ad equ aled sh ares of re turns is
a m oot q uestion ; only op era tors were interviewed. Land lords would
h ave opinions, too, which m ight differ from th ose of te n an ts.
The evidence availabl e shows th at there were condition s in exi sting leases su fficien t to cause differen ces b etwee n earning ratios for
landlords an d tenants. T h e di ffere n ces b etween sh ares of cost and
retu r n , an d b etween fixed and variable expen ses, were of su ffic ien t
size to cau se income transfers between p arties in many leases, b oth
crop-sh are an d livestock-sh are. In CSC leases, cash ren tal for h ay or
pas tu re can also ca use incom e transfer. In th ese comparison s the valu e
of rotation pasture was inclu ded in th e to tal value of crops b y ca lcul ating the equivalen t value of h ay; th e lan d lord 's crop value in clu ded
h is cash ren t from rotation p astu re. Calcul ated p rodu ction value of
rota tion pasture u su ally exceed ed ren tal valu e-whi ch accounts for
part of th e d ifferences b etween landlord an d ten a n t percen tages of
cost a nd re tu rn s. R en tal p aym en t less than produ ction value p er acre
represents an incom e transfer to th e ten a n t.
LS leases h ad 50-50 sh ares, p redominantly, for th e items sh ared.
However , in th e majority of fi rm s, the ten a n t's costs a n d also hi s re turns
exceeded those of his landlord. (As n oted earli er, th e mean differen ce
in earning ra tios was not signifi can t at th e 5 percent level). Thi s
d iffere n ce is explained largely b y the sh aring of fixed item s of cost,
wh ich is ach ieved by b ala n cing on e fixed cos t b y on e party again st
a noth er fixed cost of the other p arty, in the cus tom ary patter n of th e
community, wi th o u t going thro ugh th e addi tion al step of calcula ting
th e valu es of th ese fixed i tem s an d b alan cing doll ar values against each
oth er. T h at is, fixed cos ts in the firm are actu ally sh ared in som e such
proportion as 40-60 or 60-40, whereas all oth er sh ared cos ts are
50-50, an d som e costs are no t sh ared .
T h e results of tabula ting th e p ercentage sh ares of costs and r et urns
for landlords and ten ants in 104 LS leases are as fo llows:
1. Ten an t return s exceed ed landlord re turns in 78 leases; lan d lord
retur n s exceeded ten a n t ret urn s in 14 leases; an d returns were equ al
in 12 leases.
2. Te nan t cos ts exceeded landlord cos ts in 87 leases; la n dlord costs
exceeded tenan t costs in J7 leases; a nd th ere was equ ali ty in n o leases.
3. Ten a n t ret urns and cos ts exceed ed those o f the lan d lord in 66
leases. L an d lord return s and costs exceed th ose of te n a n ts in 3 leases.
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4. Tenant returns exceeded landlord returns b u t tenant costs were
less than landlord costs in 12 leases.
5. Tenant returns were less than landlord retu rns but tenant costs
were greater than landlord costs in 11 leases.
6. In 10 leases the returns were equal between par ties, but tenants
had greater costs.
7. In 2 leases retu rns were equal but landlord costs were larger.
Thus, costs and returns are n ot equ al between parties in a m ajority
of LS leases, in spite of the general practice of dividing the sh ared
items of costs and of returns equally. This suggests, as is well explained
and illustrated in ·w isconsin Agricul tural Research Bulletin 213,
August, 1959, that more attention is needed on the determination of
shares. Specifically, inequalities between parties can be removed by
balancing the dollar values of fixed costs agai nst each other, a nd
shifting fixed costs between parties-for example, b y sharing the costs
of m achinery-to achieve a desired fractional sh are, and then have
each party pay the same fraction al share of each variable cost as he
does of firm fixed cost, and also receive that same fract iona l share of
returns in the firm.

Amounts of Income Transfers Between Parties
Data from the returns-costs ratios for CSC leases provid e a basis
for estimating the average income transfer per farm from crop production. As shown in Table 15, the returns-costs ratio on a firm b asis
averaged 107.4; for landlords it was 134. For all CSC leases landlor ds
received an average of 44.1 percent of crop value and paid 39.6 percent
of crop costs. If it is assumed that the landlords continue to receive
44.1 percent of crop returns, but increase their percentage of crop
costs to 44. 1 percent-which automatically changes their returns-costs
ratio to 107.4 (equal to the firm ratio), tenan t income wo uld be
increased by an average of $3 15 per farm, and the tenants' r eturn-cost
ratio also would become 107.4 23
If the adjustment is made by reducing the landlord's sh are of
crops to his present sh are of costs-which also equates earning ratios
between firm, landlord and tenant- the average per farm is $403 more
income for the tenant.
On the same basis, transfers between parties are somewhat larger
on the average for LS leases. If landlords paid the same percentage of
costs as they received of returns, $6 15 more income would go to th e
tenant. If landlords received the same percentage of returns as they
pay of costs, $77 3 more income would go to tenants, on the average.
An other estimate of the extent of income transfers between parties
can b e m ade by assuming th at the landlord's presen t sh are of fix ed
2 " It is noted that the results of income transfers from tenant to la ndlord through
lease terms become capitalized in to land value in the long run .
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costs is equated with his share of variable costs and with his share of
returns. Exploratory analysis of 75 CSC leases (Iowa) indicates that
there are substantial income transfers. Of the 75 farms, 21 had transfers from tenant to landlord, and 54 from landlord to tenant. Equating
the share of fixed cost with share of variable costs and share of returns
increased landlord income an average of $1,111 per farm on 21 farms
and decreased it an average of $798 on 54 farms. The amounts varied
from a few dollars to almost $3,700 per farm.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
To summarize, farms in the three tenure groups studied differed
as to size of business, combinations of inputs and outputs, selected
characteristics of operators, and amount of expenditures on buildings.
Although there were several indications that farms operated under
LS leases made more efficient use of resources, and this mainly by
using labor on larger acreages and more livestock, many of the d ifferences between tenure groups decreased or disappeared when farms
were sorted and compared on the basis of the same size of business
as measured by total annual inputs. The findings agreed with those of
previous studies. There are few differences between the general tenure
forms as to efficiency of resource use. Tenant and 00 follow essentially the same farming practices, for the same sizes of b usiness. I n
part, the lack of significant d ifferences between groups operating
under the three different tenure forms can be attributed to the w ide
variety of farm characteristics and arrangements within tenure groups.
The lack of differences between the three general tenure forms
should not be interpreted as indicating that tenure characteristics and
arrangements are unimportant to individual operators or landlords.
For example, study of earning ratios showed that wide differences
exist between owner and tenant-operated farms; but even this range
is statistically insignificant at a probability level of 5 percent. In essence,
dollars invested in 00 farms earned the same rate of return (for the
year 1957) as did those in tenant-operated uni ts. But the earnings
ratios for landlords u nder CSC leases were significantly h igher than
those of their tenants. The earning capacity of the individual farm is
a function of quantities, qualities, and combinations of factors and
products. Further, for leased farms the tenure arrangements inclu ding
the shares of inputs and returns are matters for decision between the
two parties; if the contracting parties conclude that one receives a
higher rate of earning on the resources he furn ishes than the other,
there will likely be changes made in the content of their lease.
The selection of the tenure form is a decision which has to b e
made individually. Choice between owner-operation and tenancy,
al though influenced by the personal goals, and by availability of
capital and of farms to buy or rent, realistically is also influenced by
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rela tive earning opportunities fo r limited q uantiti es of capital. For
the fa rms in th e sample, O Os had a higher net worth th an d id ten ants,
but from an incom e-earnin g opportunity viewpoint tenancy offer ed
m ore advan tages for th e i nvestmen t of limi ted capital than d id small
0 0 farms.
Selection of the de tails of arrangement wi thin a given tenure form
are also matters of in d ividu al ch oice. T h ere is evidence of income
transfers between parties to leases; the eviden ce suggests enough d ifferences within lease types as to details of sharing cos ts an d returns to
ex plain i ncome transfers between p arties.
Net worth of OOs exceeded tha t of ten an ts. Net fa rm i ncome on
L S fa rms was significantly larger than that for CSC or 00 units
(Tabl e 2). Earning ratios on the larger farms operated under LS
leases exceeded those of the same size fa rmed by OOs, and earning
ratios fo r lan d lords were sign ifican tly larger th an fo r tenants on CSC
fa rms (Table 18). This evidence suggests th at the margin al efficiency
of capi tal, within the limits controlled b y individ uals, is hi gh er under
tenancy th an on 00 farms, a relation th at h as long been understood
and apprecia ted. Tha t is, th e n et worth of a CSC ten an t earns greater
return s fo r him wh en invested in machinery a nd operat ing capital
than if spread over all types of inp u ts as is r equi red in a small 00 u n it.
Cap ital assets of operators and lan d lords were no t stu d ied in detail.
No ques tions were asked as to h ow these capital assets were accumula ted. Obviously, h owever , the opportunity for accumula tion of n et
worth is gr eater in a size of business that provides a flow of income
which is larger than th e average annu al living costs of the family.
This condition holds for bo th owner and tenant-opera ted farm s.
T h e problem s of capital accum ula tion as r elated to fo rm of tenure
wer e b eyon d th e scop e of thi s study. I t can be noted, h owever, that
OOs ar e older th an tena nts-and h ave h ad m or e time to accum ula te
capital from both farm earnings and inheritan ce. But i t must also be
n o ted that opportunity for capital accumula tion on th e far ms in th e
sample-both tenant and 00- is much less th an tha t impli ed by the
average r eturn s/ cost r a tios in T ables 15-18 or by th e average n et
farm incom e in Table 2. Cost of family living must be taken in to
acoun t. Assuming tha t $4,000 per year is needed for fa mily living,
only 13 p ercent of the farms had firm retur n s minus firm costs large
enough to permit capita l accumulation (14 percen t of OOs, 9 percent CSC oper ators, and 16 percent of LS operators h ad net r eturns
above $4,000).
This study considered the shares and the item s shared as reported
by the fa rm operators. N o questions were asked as to how these shares
were determined. The evidence thus reports on wha t was practiced
at the time of the survey. Information from other sources indica tes
th at parties to leases accept customary arrangements as to p ercentage
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shares, i terns sha red, and rates for cash rent on h ay and pasture
Differences between shares of products, shares of cost, a nd shares of
return, and differences between earning ratios for firms, landlords, and
tenants, resulted in income transfers between p arties. Whether these
differences existed through lack of awareness, or because the existing
arra ngements were better than the next best alternati ves for the parties
concerned, cannot be determined from the ev idence available.
If owners are to receive the full earnings of the resources th ey contribute to their farm businesses, they need to devote more attention
to the determination of shares and the items shared. Further, if the
resources are to earn at rates of which they are capable-that is, if
incomes from resources are to be maximized-more attention needs to
be given to resource combinations. This means that operators need
to think more in terms of equating marginal returns between different
uses.
This study shows that many farms do not have optimum resource
combin ations. Labor and machinery for the acreages operated and the
enterprises involved appear excessive. Thus, the resource mix on many
farms might well be changed-in such simple form, for example, as
cutting down on the machinery investment and using those funds for
add itional inputs of fertilizer or weed spray. Or, more land might
be rented. Results of a study of alternative combinations under the
same total capital, but contrasting farming practices and associated
management, demonstrate that the resource combination can affect net
income within a range of nearly four times. Linear programming of a
240-acre farm with total capital constant, resulted in a net income
3. 7 times larger with improved techniques and above-average management than with average practices and management. (Net is income
defined as gross farm income minus variable costs, taxes, insura nce,
building repairs, depreciation on machinery and buildings.) 25 It is
recognized that changing the qu ality of management actually means
a change in total inputs.
Under current leasing arrangements there is little to encourage
investments by landlords or tenants in buildings. Few leases contain
provisions for cash rental on the dwelling, and few leases provide
opportunity for return on investment in service buildings. Both landlords and tenants are often dissa ti sfied with this facet of the farm
rental market; yet few depart from customary practice to solve the
problem. Does this suggest that the problem is relatively unimportant?
Or does it suggest tha t the alternative solutions are also unsatisfactory?
'' Dwight Gadsby. The Economics of Farm Land Rent. Unpubli shed Master's
Thesis, I owa State University, 1960.
What;s the " Score" on Farm Rents? Iowa Farm Science, Sept.-Oct., 1961 .
,., Gerald Dean, Earl 0. H eady, and H . H. Yeh. An Analysis of Returns from
Farm and Nonfarm Employment Opportunities on Shelby -Grundy-Haig Soils.
Research Ru.1/etin 451 Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station , May 1957. p. 107.
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Does the lack of compensation arrangemen ts in leases imply that la ndlords and tenants are un aware of th e consequences, or of th e advantages
of compensation for unexhausted improvements?
Improvements to buildings on tenant-operated farms lag behind
those on 00 units. Expenditures on service build ings and dwellings
during the 5-year period 1953-57 were larger fo r OOs in the sample.
Again, this is descriptive of current practice. The ava ilable in fo rma tion
does not explain why the conditions exist. Many ten ants said that
they wou ld have been willing to make more improvements if costs
were shared and provisions were made for compe nsation at termina tion.
One important implication for future research on tenure problems
is that further refinements a re needed to handle quality d ifferences
in inputs. The stud y reported h ere attempted to hold quality of land
equ al between farms by limi ting coverage to one general soil type.
Yet in the opinion of operators, value per acre-one measure of quality
-varied in a range of more than five times the lowest value.
Q u ality of both management and labor were in effect assumed as
equ al between farms and tenures, and between parties to the leases.
Labor was measured in terms of man weeks available. Future studies
will need to account for variations in quality of these factors and
other inputs in order to measure accu rately the relative efficiencies of
resource use under different tenures, or between farms of th e same
tenure type. One explanation of the inconclusive results of several of
the tests for differences, among and within tenures, is in quality d ifferentials in inputs.
Most factor and product prices must be taken as given in the
market, but land, buildings, labor, and management in the firm are
priced by decisions of operators; the buyer participates in the price
determination. When the price paid to the owner of a resource-such
as land, labor, and management-is a share of the products of the
firm, there is reason to do something more th an accept "customary
sh ares" in th e community.
What
do the findings in this study sugges t for adj ustments in
form and structure of tenure, inclu di ng content of leases? They are
summarized as follows:
1. The general tenure fo rms-own er-operatorsh ip, CSC leases, an d
LS leases- each serve a n important purpose and provide opportunities
for efficient farm organization wh en resources are available in sufficien t
quantities. No changes are needed in the forms as such. Because of
the impacts of capital limita tion among individuals, the differing possibilities of effective combina tions under the distinct lease forms, and
the pressures of both technology and prices on farm enlargement, th e
relative proportions will change through time. Leasing is a means
to farm enlargement.
2. Farms in each tenure class suffer from capital limitations wh ich
affect improvement investments and use of output-increasing practices.
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Another retarding factor is lack of knowledge of effects of practices
such as weed spray, fertilizer and feeding additives. Expansion in size
of business does not necessarily require more land per farm. But expansion through intensification of both crop and livestock practices may
require more credit. Capital may be self-rationed, in which case the
solution depends on removing the reason for such rationing. If rationed
by lenders the solution to credit problems probably lies outside of
the farm tenure arrangements.
3. For leased farms, both CSC and LS, percentage shares show
little variation. Customary shares rule. Parties to leases stand to benefit by determining the shares that fit their particular objectives and
available capital. Fitting the percentage shares to the conditions of
the proposed lease should remove the possibilities of income transfer
between parties.
4. Analysis via Cobb-Douglas production function showed that
the margin al value product of land exceeded its opportunity cost in
each of the three tenures; also, labor opportunity cost exceeded its
marginal returns on owner and CSC farms (Table 14). Returns/ cost
comparisons showed that landlords r eceived higher returns on their
inputs than d id tenants (Tables 19 and 20). Inasmuch as real estate
is usually the major input of the landlord, it is evident that the
rental market allocated to land a return more favorable than that from
other inputs. This fact has many implications as to the need for change
in sharing of costs and returns between land owners and tenants.
In addition, the evidence of excess labor and m achinery in relation to land, and of the need for changes in combinations of inputs
for more efficient production, suggest that re-allocation of these factors
between farms is a necessary adjustment, for both tenant and 00 farms.
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APPENDIX A.
The Sample
The sample was drawn by Duane F. Neuman, graduate assista n t at
the University of Nebraska and ·w alter G. MilJer, Farm Economics
Division, Economic R esearch Service, U nited States Department of
Agriculture. Block area segments of four sections each were outlined
a nd numbered on county high way maps of th e study area. T his area
is a relatively homogeneous section of the deep loess soils of: Northwest
Missouri (Atchison, Nodaway, Holt, Andrew, and Buchanan Co unties);
Southwest Iowa (P ottawattami, M ills, Montgomery, Fremont, and Page
Counties); Southeast Nebraska (Lancaster, Cass, Otoe, Nemaha, and
Richardson Counties); and Torthwest Kansas (Brown, Doniphan,
Atchison, Leavenworth Counties). Sections with mainly bottomland
and those with urban areas were excluded.
All operators within the block of four sections were screened, by
personal interview or from information given b y neighbors, to provide approximately equal numbers of owner-operators, crop-share
cash renters, and livestock-share renters. T h e screening r es ulted in
listing of so few cash renters that this group was excluded. T h e following types of operators were also excluded from the study: (a) h ired
managers; (b) part owners; (c) partnerships; (d) owner-operators over
54; (e) crop-sh are renters; (f) tenants with mixed leases; (g) full tenants
wh o rented from their own or their wife's parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters, uncles, or aunts; (h) owners or ten ants who operated less
than 70 acres; (i) those who oper ated land consisting of 25 percent or
more of bottomland.

APPENDIX B.
The prod uction functions (Cobb-Dou glas) were of th e form
bl b2
b 11
Y = aX 1 X 2 .. .. X 11 or log Y = log a + b 1 log X 1 + .... + bu log XnFor th e crop function:
Y = gross value crop production : grain and hay, rotation pasture,
soil bank payments, a nd .8 of receipts from custom work done on other
farms .
X 1 = cropland in acres : h ay, grain, rotation pasture, soil bank.
X 2 = labor in weeks: operator's crop labor, .75 of weeks of wife's
and children 's crop labor, hired crop labor, a nd weeks of custom labor.
X 3 = crop machine services : .26 of estimated value of crop
machinery fuel, o il, machinery repair, an d .8 of custom hire of
machinery.
X 4 = miscellaneous crop expense: fertilizer and lime on cropland,
farm-produced grains used for seed , plants, seed treatment, crop-building repairs, crop sh are of farm electricity, and other miscellaneous.
For th e livestock functio n :
Y = total livestock production: sales less p urch ases, home-used livestock and products, and change in inventory.
X 1 = beginning inventory plus ending inven tory livestock divided
by 2.
X 2 = livestock labor, weeks: op erator labor, .75 of weeks of wife's
and children's livestock labor, and hired labor.
X 3 = livestock building and equipment investment: estimated value.
X 4 = feeds fed: value of rotation and permanent pasture, farmprodu ced feeds fed, and commercial feeds.
X 5 = miscellaneous: veterinary expense, breeding feeds, livestock
building repairs, livestock fuel, oil and equipment r epairs, electricity,
a nd other cash expense.
Number of Usable Schedules by T enure Class and State.
N umber of sched ules

T enure class

I Missouri
Owner-oper ators
Crop-sh are cash renters
Livestock-share r e nters
Totals

55
25
23
103

Iowa

Nebraska

67

29
65
20

9

160

4
4

17 1
104

ll4

17

435

77

57
201

Kansas

Total

